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FUTURE PROPERTY AND THE
TORRENS SYSTEM
GLEN ANDERSON*
Since at least the seventeenth century, courts of equity have upheld the 
assignment of future property for valuable consideration. Despite this long 
lineage, however, there has been almost no scholarly analysis of how these 
principles might interact with the Torrens system. The present article 
addresses this deficiency. Generally, it argues that there are no reasons why 
principles of future property cannot be fully subsumed within the Torrens 
system. 
I  INTRODUCTION
The present article investigates how assignments of future property1 might 
interact with the Torrens system. In doing so, it probes the intersection of 
two divergent forces: equity’s pre-modern jurisdiction grounded in 
conscience and substance, and the relatively contemporary Torrens system,
based on registration, administrative uniformity, and title certainty.
The article argues that there are no reasons why principles of future property 
cannot be fully subsumed within the Torrens system. More specifically, it 
contends that well established features of the Torrens system, such as 
caveats and the in personam exception to indefeasibility, would be readily 
applicable to future land2 transactions and disputes.
The article consists of four main sections. Section II enumerates the general 
principles applicable to the assignment of future property. Section III 
examines aspects of the assignment of future land common to all land title 
* BA (Hons) BA/LLB(Hons) PhD (Macq) Lecturer in Law, University of Newcastle,
Australia.
1 Meaning property which is yet to be acquired by the assignor, and which the assignor has
no legal right to acquire at the time of the assignment. Future property is only assignable in
equity for valuable consideration. The principles of future property, and their applicability
to land, are discussed in further detail infra.
2 Meaning land which is assigned pursuant to principles of future property.
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types. Section IV specifically analyses the interactions between future 
property and the Torrens system. Most importantly, this section outlines the 
case for a new in personam claim: failure to assure future Torrens land. 
Section V synthesises all aspects of the preceding discussion and concludes 
that there are no barriers to the assignment of future land within the Torrens 
system.
II GENERAL PRINCIPLES
‘Future property’3 can be defined as, ‘property which does not exist or in 
which the assignor at the time of the assignment has no proprietary 
interest.’4 Or as defined by Heydon, Leeming and Turner: 
By way of the terms ‘future property’, ‘(mere) expectancy’, ‘spes’ or ‘spes 
successionis’ what is generally meant is a right or title which one has not yet 
acquired and lacks a legal right to acquire but which one may acquire in the future.5
These definitions do not capture property anticipated as the result of a 
procedure of a chattel; this is instead termed ‘potential property’ and is 
considered to have a present existence, however counter-intuitive this might 
seem.6  
A legal assignment of future property is nugatory7 as the law historically 
refused to give recognition to ‘prophetic conveyance[s].’8 An assignment 
of future property can thus only be made in equity.9 For this to occur, 
however, there must be valuable consideration to bind the assignor’s 
3 Also referred to as ‘after acquired property’.
4 Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson (1951) 82 CLR 477, 484 (Latham CJ).
5 JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity 
Doctrines and Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) 256.
6 JF Keeler, ‘Some Reflections on Holroyd v Marshall’ (1967–70) 3 Adelaide Law Review
360, footnote 1. For judicial consideration of potential property, see Norman v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 25 (Windeyer J); Re Puntoriero; Ex parte 
Nickpack Pty Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 523, 529–30 (Einfeld J).
7 Chauncy v Graydon (1743) 2 Atk 616, 621 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Robinson v Macdonnell
(1816) 5 M & S 228, 235–36 (Lord Ellenborough CJ); Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 
191; (1862) 11 ER 999, HLC 209 (Lord Westbury LC), HLC 216 (Lord Chelmsford); Lloyd 
v European and North American Railway Co (1878) 18 NBR 194, 206–07 (Allen CJ); Akron 
Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson (1951) 82 CLR 477, 484 (Latham CJ); Norman v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 20 (Menzies J (with whom Owen J agreed)).
8 Belding v Read (1865) 3 H & C 995, 961 (Pollock CB).
9 Warmstrey v Tanfield (1628–29) 1 Ch Rep 29, 30; Bates v Dandy (1741) 3 Russ 89; 38 ER 
505, 507 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Chauncy v Graydon (1743) 2 Atk 616, 621 (Lord 
Hardwicke LC); Grey v Kentish (1749) 1 Atk 280, 280 (Lord Hardwicke LC);
Alexander v The Duke of Wellington (1831) 2 Russ & My 35, 51 (Sir John Leach MR); Meek 
v Kettlewell (1843) 1 Ph 342, 347 (Lord Lyndhurst LC); Roderick v Gandell (1849) 12 Beav 
325, 330 (Lord Langdale MR); Lindsay v Gibbs (1856) 22 Beav 522, 528 (Sir John Romilly 
MR). 
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conscience10 and overcome the equitable maxim, equity will not assist a 
volunteer.11
Apart from any statutory requirements of writing, an assignment of future 
property does not require any specific form.12 An equitable assignment 
‘may be couched in the language of command. It may be a courteous 
request. It may assume the form of mere permission. The language is 
immaterial if the meaning is plain.’13 This stems from the equitable maxim,
equity looks to substance rather than form. Having said this, an assignment 
of future property will not have occurred unless the assignor and assignee 
have agreed to the assignment.14
When legal title15 to future property vests in the assignor, it will be held eo 
instanti on bare constructive trust for the assignee.16 As expressed by 
10 Chauncy v Graydon (1743) 2 Atk 616, 621 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Meek v Kettlewell (1843) 
1 Ph 342, 347 (Lord Lyndhurst LC); Bennett v Cooper (1845–1846) 9 Beav 252, 258 (Lord 
Langdale MR); Re Ellenborough, Towry Law v Burne [1903] 1 Ch 697, 700 (Buckley J); 
Redman v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1916) 22 CLR 84, 95–96 (Isaacs J); Palette 
Shoes Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 16 (Latham CJ); In Re Brooks’ 
Settlement Trusts; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Tillard [1939] Ch 993, 998 (Farwell J); Norman v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 21 (Menzies J (with whom Owen J 
agreed)), 24 (Windeyer J); Re Florio (1979) 97 DLR (3d) 74 [7] (MacKinnon J); Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440, 453 (Barwick CJ, Stephen, 
Mason and Wilson JJ); Re Androma Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 134, 138–39 (Connolly J), 149 
(McPherson J); Westgold Resources NL v St George Bank Ltd (1998) 29 ACSR 396, 434 
(Anderson J); Schipp v Cameron [1999] NSWSC 997 [863] (Einstein J); Porters v 
Cessnock City Council [2005] NSWSC 1275 [25] (Campbell J); JT Nominees Pty Ltd v 
Macks (2007) 97 SASR 471 [116] & [120] (Bleby J); Re Erskine 1948 Trust [2012] EWHC 
732 (Ch) [46] (Mark Herbert QC).
11 Williams v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1965] NZLR 395, 399 (Turner J); Norman v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 24 (Windeyer J).
12 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454, 462 (Lord 
Macnaghten); Palette Shoes Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 15 (Latham 
CJ); Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 22 (Menzies J (with 
whom Owen J agreed)), 32 (Windeyer J); Shepherd v Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 
113 CLR 385, 391 (Barwick CJ); Elders Pastoral Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [1991] 1 
NZLR 385, 387 (Lord Templeman); Tsu Soo Sin v Oei Tjiong Bin [2008] SGCA 46 [33] 
(Rajah JA).
13 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454, 462 (Lord 
Macnaghten). See also Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523, 543 (Lord 
Macnaghten). 
14 Re Hamilton; FitzGeorge v FitzGeorge (1921) 124 LT 737, 739.
15 It is also possible that an assignment of future property can occur with respect to equitable 
title (for example the beneficial interest of shares under a trust yet to be acquired by the 
assignor) but this is not typically encountered. 
16 Legard v Hodges (1792) 1 Ves Jun 478 (Lord Thurlow LC); In Re Gillott’s Settlement; 
Chattock v Reid [1934] 1 Ch 97, 108–09 (Maugham J); Bakewell v Deputy Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (SA) (1937) 58 CLR 743, 761–62 (Starke J); Visbord v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1943) 68 CLR 344, 383 (Williams J); Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation v Everett (1978) 21 ALR 625, 644 (Deane J); Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440, 450 (Barwick CJ, Stephen, Mason and Wilson 
JJ); Booth v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 165 (Mason CJ), 178 
(Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517, 
520 (Cooke P (with whom Casey and Hardie Boys JJ and Sir Gordon Bisson agreed)), 527 
(Richardson J (with whom Casey and Hardie Boys JJ and Sir Gordon Bisson agreed)); 
Bluebottle UK Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2006] NSWSC 706 [60] (Gzell J); 
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bluebottle UK Ltd [2006] NSWCA 360 [25]–[26] 
(Santow JA (with whom Mason P agreed)); RIL Aviation HL 7740 and HL 7741 Pty Ltd v 
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McPherson J in Re Androma Pty Ltd17 there is no ‘scintilla temporis or 
fragment of time during which the equitable interest’ vests in the assignor.18
The assignor will thus be required to transfer the legal title to the assignee 
forthwith.19
In a technical sense, equity does not assign future property immediately 
upon the making of a contract for valuable consideration to do so, as this 
would be a practical impossibility: one cannot immediately assign 
something that one does not have.20 Instead, equity ‘activates’ the formerly 
torpid agreement to assign once the legal title to the property is vested in 
the assignor as bare constructive trustee.21 This has been characterised as a
special application of the equitable maxim: equity regards that as done 
which ought to be done.22
Finally, the assignee’s right in equity to future property can be negated if 
the assignor sells the property to a bona fide purchaser for value without 
Alliance & Leicester plc [2011] NSWCA 423 [206]–[207] (Young JA); Commissioner of 
State Revenue v Abbotts Exploration Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 211 [210] (Murphy JA); 
Lotteries Pty Ltd v Volteas [2015] VSCA 226 [38] (Whelan JA (with whom Ferguson and 
McLeish JJA agreed)); Malcolm Cope, Constructive Trusts (Lawbook Company Limited, 
1992) 999 (explaining that the trust is constructive).
17 [1987] 2 Qd R 134.
18 Ibid 135.
19 It has been suggested that ‘one way in which equity supports such an assignment is by 
treating the transaction, though in form an assignment, as containing or importing a 
covenant to do that which is necessary to effect the validity of the assignment.’ See In re 
Mudge [1914] 1 Ch 115, 122 (Cozens-Hardy MR); Re Lind; Industrials Finance Syndicate 
Limited v Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345, 370 (Bankes LJ).
20 Collyer v Isaacs (1881) 19 Ch D 342, 351 (Jessel MR); Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474, 
490 (Parker J); Re Lind; Industrials Finance Syndicate Limited v Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345, 
363 (Phillimore LJ); Horwood v Millar’s Timber & Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305, 315 
(Warrington LJ); Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 24–25
(Windeyer J); Re Androma Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 134, 138 (Connolly J); Watson v 
National Companies and Securities Commission [1988] WAR 332, 338–39 (Malcolm CJ 
(with whom Wallace and Brinsden JJ agreed)); Re Edelsten; Deputy Commissioner of 
Taxation (NSW) v Donnelly (1989) 89 ALR 232, 241 (von Doussa J); Ansett Australia 
Limited (subject to a deed of company arrangement) v Travel Software Solutions Pty Ltd
[2007] VSC 326 [51] (Hargrave J); FTV Holdings Cairns Pty Ltd v Smith [2014] QCA 217 
[43] (Fraser JA (with whom Holmes JA and Ann Lyons J agreed)).
21 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999, HLC 220; ER 1010 (Lord 
Chelmsford); Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 24 
(Windeyer J); Booth v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 165 
(Mason CJ); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New 
South Wales (1993) 45 FCR 284; 117 ALR 61, 73 (Hill J (with whom Beazley J agreed)); 
Peter W Young, Clyde Croft and Megan Louise Smith, On Equity (Lawbook Co, 2009) 
719.
22 Palette Shoes Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 26 (Dixon J); Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v Everett (1978) 21 ALR 625, 644 (Deane J); Booth v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 178 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Hadlee v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517, 527 (Richardson J (with whom 
Casey and Hardie Boys JJ and Sir Gordon Bisson agreed)); McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 
ALR 289, 296–97 (Davies, Burchett and Gummow JJ); Lotteries Pty Ltd v Volteas [2015] 
VSCA 226 [38] (Whelan JA (with whom Ferguson and McLeish JJA agreed)); JD Heydon, 
MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and 
Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) 269.
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notice of the earlier equitable assignment.23 Under these circumstances the
earlier assignee will be entitled to damages from the assignor under breach 
of contract.24
III FUTURE PROPERTY AND LAND
In Metcalfe v Archbishop of York25 Lord Cottenham LC stated that: ‘[t]here 
can be no doubt that a covenant to charge or dispose of, or affect lands 
hereafter to be acquired, operates in equity upon lands so afterwards 
acquired.’26 Although at the abstract level it is certain that the doctrines of 
future property are applicable to land, in practice it is less certain exactly 
how this might occur. When analysing rules of future property vis-à-vis
land, it is submitted that three initial issues require consideration: whether 
the land is future property; whether the assignment complies with any 
statutory requirements of writing; and how precisely the land must be 
described in order to make the assignment effective. Each are discussed 
seriatim below.
A Is the Land Future Property?
Land transactions usually involve present property. Typically, the assignor 
enters into a contract for the sale of land with the assignee, which is 
accompanied by the latter paying a ten per cent deposit. Six weeks 
ordinarily pass before settlement, whereupon the outstanding balance is 
paid by the assignee and the legal title is transferred. The key point which 
denotes that the agreement is one involving present property is that the 
assignor is the legal title holder at the time of making the contract with the 
assignee.  
A land transaction can, however, involve future property.27 For example:
the assignor assigns land which he or she does not yet have the legal title 
                                                          
23 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999, HLC 219; ER 1010 (Lord 
Chelmsford); Joseph v Lyons (1884) 15 QBD 280, 285 (Brett MR), 286 (Cotton LJ), 287 
(Lindley LJ); Hallas v Robinson (1885) 15 QBD 288, 291–92 (Brett MR), 292 (Baggallay 
LJ), 293 (Lindley LJ). See generally, Peter W Young, Clyde Croft and Megan Louise 
Smith, On Equity (Lawbook Co, 2009) 722.
24 Government Employees Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224; BC9704036, 
101 (Ipp J); Peter W Young, Clyde Croft and Megan Louise Smith, On Equity (Lawbook 
Co, 2009) 722.
25 (1836) 1 My & Cr 547; 40 ER 485.
26 Ibid ER 489. See also Wilcocks v Wilcocks (1706) 2 Ver 588; 23 ER 961; Morse v Faulkner
(1792) 3 Swan 429; West v Berney (1819) 1 Rus & My 431, 434 (Sir John Leach V-C);
Imrie v Archibald (1895) 25 SCR 368, 387–88 (Sir Henry Strong CJC); Royal Bank v 
Madill (1981) 120 DLR (3d) 17 [73]–[79] (Stevenson J); Bridge Wholesale Acceptance 
Corporation (Aust) Ltd v Burnard (1992) 27 NSWLR 415, 421 (Clarke JA (with whom 
Mahoney and Meagher JJA agreed)).
27 Wilcocks v Wilcocks (1706) 2 Ver 588; 23 ER 961; Morse v Faulkner (1792) 3 Swan 429; 
West v Berney (1819) 1 Rus & My 431, 434 (Sir John Leach V-C); Metcalfe v Archbishop 
of York (1836) 1 My & Cr 547; 40 ER 485, 489 (Lord Cottenham LC).
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to, and may never obtain, to the assignee.28 The key point which denotes
that the agreement is one involving future property is that the assignor is
not vested with the legal title at the time of making the agreement with the 
assignee, and whether this will in fact ever occur is a mere contingency
(beyond the assignor’s control). Thus, whenever there is an element of 
chance involved with the assignor acquiring the legal title to land, an 
assignment of future property will have occurred.
B Statutory Requirements of Writing
A statutory requirement of writing29 applies to executory contracts for the 
sale of land.30 An assignment of future land is by its nature executory, as 
there are still further steps necessary in order to finalise, or execute, the 
intended disposition of the legal title. Writing is therefore required.31  
It is often said, however, that the assignor of future property, once vested 
with the legal title, will be constituted as a bare constructive trustee for the 
assignee.32 Does this have any impact upon the foregoing? The answer is 
‘no’—even if the assignment is considered to create an executory trust in 
favour of the assignee, it is still required to be in writing under the same 
statutory provisions as a regular executory contract.33
C How Precisely the Land Must be Described 
In Order to Make the Assignment Effective
Assuming that the previous two issues are satisfied, a third issue requires 
consideration, namely, how precisely the land must be described in order to 
make the assignment effective. The most usual and straightforward way that 
this will be satisfied is when land is described in specific detail, so as to 
enable identification in the future. If the assignor later becomes the legal 
28 A typical example might be the assignment of an expectancy of land under a will: Re 
Ellenborough, Towry Law v Burne [1903] 1 Ch 697, 699 (Buckley J); Bennett v Cooper
(1845–1846) 9 Beav 252, 256–58 (Lord Langdale MR); Re Clarke; Coombe v Carter
(1887) 36 Ch D 348, 352–53 (Cotton LJ), 357 (Bowen LJ), 358 (Fry LJ); Edwin M Hughs 
v La Limited [2011] UKPC 9 [27] (Lord Walker (on behalf of the Privy Council)); Re 
Erskine 1948 Trust [2012] EWHC 732 (Ch) [46] (Mark Herbert QC).
29 Section 54A(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW); s 126 of the Instruments Act 1958
(Vic); s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld); s 26(1) of the Law of Property Act 1936
(SA); s 36(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas); s 201 of the Civil 
Law (Property) Act 2006 (ACT); s 62 of the Law of Property Act 2000 (NT). In Western 
Australia s 4 of the Statue of Frauds remains in effect although subject to the Law Reform 
(Statute of Frauds) Act 1962 (WA). 
30 The requirement of writing applies to old system title and Torrens title. See, for example, 
s 54A(3) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). 
31 It is theoretically possible that the equitable doctrine of part performance might overcome 
any need for writing. See eg, s 54A(2) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).  
32 See supra footnote 16.
33 Khoury v Khouri [2006] NSWCA 184 [4]–[6] (Handley JA) [15] (Hodgson JA) [50]–[51] 
(Bryson JA). Once the land is vested in the assignor, the disposition to the assignee must 
also be in writing. See, for example, s 23C(1)(a) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). 
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owner of the land and refuses to honour the contract, the assignee will have 
recourse to equity to make good the transfer. 
A more difficult question is whether a ‘general’ assignment of land will be 
valid. Take the following example: if the assignor agrees to assign any and 
all land in their possession to the assignee at a future point in time 
determinable by a particular condition, will the requirement of descriptive 
specificity be sufficiently met so as to make the assignment binding? In 
order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider the authorities on 
future assignments couched in general terms. 
A requisite starting point is Holroyd v Marshall.34 In that case Taylor, a 
damask manufacturer in Ovenden, York County, was in financial 
difficulties and sold machinery in his mill to AP and W Holroyd on terms 
which allowed Taylor to re-purchase for £5000. The machinery was 
transferred to Brunt, to hold it as trustee for Taylor absolutely if he should 
pay £5000 to AP and W Holroyd. The deed which set up this transaction 
included, ‘all machinery, implements and things, which during the 
continuance of this security, shall be placed in or about’ the mill. Taylor 
added further machinery to the mill without assuring it to the trustee, which 
his judgment creditors sought to levy execution against. AP and W 
Holroyd’s title prevailed over that of Taylor’s judgment creditors. Lord 
Westbury LC observed: 
[I]f a vendor or mortgagor agrees to sell or mortgage property, real or
personal, of which he is not possessed at the time, and he receives the
consideration for the contract, and afterwards becomes possessed of
property answering the description in the contract, there is no doubt that
a Court of Equity would compel him to perform the contract, and that the
contract would, in equity, transfer the beneficial interest to the mortgagee
or purchaser immediately on the property being acquired. This, of course,
assumes that the supposed contract is one of that class of which a Court
of Equity would decree specific performance.35
The Lord Chancellor thus held that the assignment of future property would 
be ineffective, if, at the date when the future property enters the assignor’s 
hands, the court would decline an order for specific performance of the 
contract to assign. This dictum subsequently caused difficulties for lower 
level courts which felt compelled to render assignments of future property 
ineffective if they were described in general, as opposed to specific, terms. 
In Belding v Read,36 for example, the court was required to decide the 
degree of descriptive specificity necessary for the assignment of future 
property. The assignor, Randelstone, carried on a business as a grocer and 
draper, and had assigned to Read all his personal estate and effects, 
‘thereafter to be upon or about his dwelling house, farm and premises, 
situate in … Reedham or elsewhere in Great Britain.’ Read had seized and 
sold personalty acquired by the assignor after the execution of the deed, 
34 (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999.
35 Ibid HLC 211; ER 1007.
36 (1865) 3 H & C 995.
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some of it having been taken from a dwelling house in Reedham, and some 
from another property in Great Yarmouth. The plaintiff, who was the trustee 
in bankruptcy of the assignor’s estate, demanded an account of the property 
seized by Read. The court ultimately found that the assignment failed as it 
was cast too generally, lacking the requisite descriptive specificity.37 The 
court endorsed the position that an assignment of future property would 
only be binding if it was amenable to an order for specific performance. 
Martin B, for example, stated that, ‘equitable title to goods as well as land 
is confined to specific goods, and does not extend to goods which are 
undetermined.’38 Martin B continued that in Holroyd v Marshall,39 ‘the 
property in dispute, which was new machinery, by being brought into the 
mill and affixed to the old machinery, was sufficiently earmarked to have 
entitled the mortgagee to file a bill for specific performance.’40 Bramwell B 
also stressed the importance of descriptive specificity when assigning future 
property: 
[In Holroyd v Marshall] machinery, which in a sense was not specific 
when the deed was executed, having become specific by being brought 
into a particular mill, and made a part of its machinery, it was held that 
… a covenant or grant of this nature would confer an equitable interest 
in it.41  
Channell B similarly found that: 
[I]n Holroyd v Marshall … the House of Lords appear only to have
adopted and carried out that rule [what has been contracted to be done is
to be considered done]. But the goods which formed the subject of that
inquiry were goods of a specific character, brought upon the premises
after the contract was made, and there affixed to and made part of the old
machinery.42
The court thus attempted to maintain fidelity to Lord Westbury LC’s dicta
in Holroyd v Marshall43 by stressing the need for an assignment of future 
property to relate to specific, as opposed to general, property.  
A similar method of reasoning was applied by Fry J in In re Count 
D’Epineuil (No 2).44 In that case the issue was whether a charge by the 
Count D’Épineuil ‘of all my present and future personalty’ in favour of the 
plaintiff, Tadman, was valid. Fry J, after considering Holroyd v Marshall45
and Belding v Read,46 held that ‘equitable title to goods and land was 
confined to specific goods, and did not extend to goods which were 
37 An exception was the judgment of Pollock CB at 961–62 which failed to acknowledge that 
equity allows the assignment of future property for valuable consideration.
38 (1865) 3 H & C 995, 962. 
39 (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999.
40 (1865) 3 H & C 995, 964.
41 Ibid 964–65.
42 Ibid 965.
43 (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999.
44 (1882) 20 Ch D 758.
45 (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999.
46 (1865) 3 H & C 995.
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undetermined.’47 Furthermore, Fry J was concerned not to enforce the 
charge with respect to goods acquired after the date of the agreement on 
public policy grounds, as to do so would render the Count D’Épineuil 
destitute and unable to maintain himself.48
In Re Clarke; Coombe v Carter,49 the question of general and specific future 
property again emerged, this time in the context of an expectancy under a 
will. In that case the assignor, Hart, was a mortgagor, who had assigned to 
the mortgagee, South Essex Equitable Investments and Advances Company 
Limited, ‘all moneys of or to which he then was or might during the security 
become entitled, under any settlement, will, or other document, either in his 
own right, or as a devisee, legatee, or next of kin of any person’ and also all 
real and personal property ‘of, in, or to which the mortgagor is or during 
this security shall become beneficially seised, possessed, entitled, or 
interested for any vested, contingent, or possible estate or interest.’ Hart 
became entitled under the will of Clarke to a one twenty-third share of the 
residuary estate, and the testator’s executor took out an originating 
summons to determine whether the share was included in Hart’s mortgage. 
With reference to Clements v Matthews,50 the court decided that the 
assignment was divisible into its constituent parts.51 This meant that aspects 
of the agreement which were general in nature were ineffective, and those 
aspects which were specific, namely, the assignment for valuable 
consideration of all moneys to which the assignor should become entitled 
under a will, were effective. Bowen LJ presciently noted the unsatisfactory 
nature of Holroyd v Marshall52 and the need for appellate clarification in 
this branch of equitable jurisdiction:  
The time will come when the Court of Appeal will have to consider the law 
as to assignments of future property, and to lay down, if it can, for the 
guidance of the profession some more definite rule than is to be gathered 
from the cases since Holroyd v. Marshall. As it seems to me, language has 
been used in some of them which tends to confuse the two distinct ideas, of 
vagueness in the contract, and vagueness which arises from the difficulty of 
identifying future property. ‘Vagueness’ is a misleading term. A contract 
may be so vague in its terms that it cannot be understood, and in that case it 
is of no effect at law or in equity. There is another kind of vagueness which 
arises from the property not being ascertained at the date of the contract, but 
if at the time when the contract is sought to be enforced the property has 
come in esse and is capable of being identified as that to which the contract 
refers, I cannot see why there is in it any such vagueness as to prevent a 
Court of Equity from enforcing the contract.53
47 (1882) 20 Ch D 758, 759–60.
48 Ibid 760. See, to similar effect, Re Clarke; Coombe v Carter (1887) 36 Ch D 348, 352 
(Cotton LJ), 357–58 (Fry LJ); Horwood v Millar’s Timber & Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 
305, 311 (Lord Cozens-Hardy MR); King v Michael Faraday and Partners Ltd [1939] 2 
KB 753, 763–64 (Atkinson J).
49 (1887) 36 Ch D 348.
50 (1882–83) LR 11 QBD 808. 
51 Re Clarke; Coombe v Carter (1887) 36 Ch D 348, 353–54 (Cotton LJ), 354–55 (Bowen 
LJ), 357–58 (Fry LJ).
52 (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999.
53 (1887) 36 Ch D 348, 354–55.
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The question of specific and general future property reappeared in Official 
Receiver v Tailby.54 In that case a mortgagor, Izon, a Birmingham packing 
case manufacturer, assigned to a mortgagee, Tyrrell, inter alia, ‘all the book 
debts due and owing or which may during the continuance of this security 
become due and owing to the said mortgagor.’ Izon later supplied Wilson 
Brothers & Co (WBC) with goods to the value of £10 7s 11d on credit. 
Subsequent to this, Tyrell died, and his executors sought to call in the 
money due to his estate. The executors demanded payments, took 
possession of the mortgaged premises and sold the books debts. Shortly 
thereafter, Tailby, who had acquired the book debt relating to WBC, gave 
notice to the firm demanding payment, which was duly satisfied. Izon, 
meanwhile, had become bankrupt. The question was whether Tailby had a 
title to the book debt which was better than the official receiver in the 
administration of Izon’s bankrupt estate.  
At first instance, the county court judge, relying on the authorities of 
Belding v Read55 and In re Count D’Epineuil (No 2),56 held that Izon’s 
assignment of future book debts to Tyrrell was ineffective, as it lacked the 
requisite descriptive specificity. On appeal, Matthew and Hawkins JJ 
reversed this result,57 noting that if unspecified future stock in trade might 
be assigned, as indicated by Clements v Matthews,58 then so too might 
unspecified future book debts, despite authority to the contrary in Belding v 
Read59 and In re Count D’Epineuil (No 2).60 On further appeal, this result 
was reversed, with Lord Esher MR holding that the assignment of the future 
books debts was ‘too vague’, but if the assignment of the book debts had 
been confined to ‘future book debts accruing due in a particular business’
this would not be the case.61 Lindley LJ took a similar view, explicitly 
linking the assignment of future property with specific performance:
The question, therefore, in such a case as this must, as it seems to me, be 
determined with reference to the doctrine of specific performance. I think 
that it would be going far beyond any of the cases that have been decided 
to say that specific performance would be decreed of such a contract as 
this. I do not say that an assignment of future book debts must necessarily 
be too vague; but, where there is no limitation of them with regard to any 
particular business, I think the assignment is too vague.62
54 (1888) 18 QBD 25.
55 (1865) 3 H & C 995.
56 (1882) 20 Ch D 758.
57 (1886) 17 QBD 88, 92–93 (Mathew and Hawkins JJ).
58 (1883) 11 QBD 808.
59 (1865) 3 H & C 995.
60 (1882) 20 Ch D 758.
61 (1888) 18 QBD 25, 29.
62 Ibid 30–31.
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Lopes LJ, relying on Holroyd v Marshall63 and Belding v Read,64 likewise 
stressed the need for an assignment of future property to be specific as 
opposed to general.65
The result was appealed to the House of Lords in Tailby v Official 
Receiver.66 Lord Herschell expounded:  
Now whatever the learned Lord [Westbury LC] meant [in Holroyd v 
Marshall] by limiting the doctrine to the class of cases in which a Court 
of Equity would decree specific performance, he certainly did not intend 
to exclude cases in which after-acquired property fell within general 
descriptive words contained in the deed, for he enforced the security in 
that very case against such property. Nor, again, can I find any trace of 
the view that a Court of Equity would not enforce a contract relating to 
future-acquired property if it was vague, in the sense of embracing much 
within its terms, for, as I have pointed out, Courts of Equity have 
frequently enforced such contracts.67  
Lord Watson similarly noted:
Mere difficulty in ascertaining all the things which are included in a 
general assignment, whether in esse or in posse, will not affect the 
assignee’s right to those things which are capable of ascertainment or are 
identified.68  
Lord Macnaghten explicitly clarified the relationship between the 
assignment of future property, the need for descriptive specificity and 
specific performance: 
Greater confusion still, I think, would be caused by transferring 
considerations applicable to suits for specific performance … to cases of 
equitable assignment or specific lien. … The doctrines relating to specific 
performance do not, I think, afford a test or measure of the rights 
accrued.69  
The House of Lords thus removed the tendency in cases such as Belding v 
Read,70 In re Count D’Epineuil (No 2),71 Re Clarke; Coombe v 
Carter,72 and Official Receiver v Tailby73 to make general assignments of 
future property ineffective. 
63 (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999.
64 (1865) 3 H & C 995.
65 (1888) 18 QBD 25, 31.
66 (1888) 13 App Cas 523.
67 Ibid 531.
68 Ibid 533.
69 Ibid 547–48. This view was adopted, even though all of their Lordships in Tailby v Official 
Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523 felt the result in Belding v Read (1865) 3 H & C 995 was, 
with respect to the facts therein, decided incorrectly. See JF Keeler, ‘Some Reflections on 
Holroyd v. Marshall’ (1967–70) 3 Adelaide Law Review 369.
70 (1865) 3 H & C 995.
71 (1882) 20 Ch D 758.
72 (1887) 36 Ch D 348.
73 (1888) 18 QBD 25.
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This overall interpretation was subsequently confirmed by the widespread 
recognition of floating charges in the late nineteenth century.74 This is 
because the very nature of a floating charge allows the chargor to charge all 
present and future property which might circulate through the business. A 
floating charge (or in contemporary parlances, a circulating security 
interest)75 thus comprises a general assignment of future property.76 Indeed 
it was this exact type of interest that the House of Lords was grappling with 
in Holroyd v Marshall,77 although a suitable descriptor had not yet been 
devised.
Beyond the company floating charge context, that an assignment of future 
land might be couched in general terms has been explicitly approved in 
Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corporation (Aust) Ltd v Burnard.78 In that 
case Burnard and Florence, trading as Burnard and Sons, had entered into a 
leasing agreement with Bridge Wholesale Corporation Australia Ltd 
(BWCAL) for forklift trucks and accessories for a period of forty-two 
months. On the same day, Burnard and Florence entered into a deed with 
BWCAL, which guaranteed payment of all money due under the lease. The 
deed allowed BWCAL, upon payment default, to place a legal mortgage 
over ‘any land now or hereafter held’ by Burnard and Florence. Default 
occurred and BWCAL lodged a caveat over Torrens land owned by Burnard 
claiming a right to a grant of a legal or equitable mortgage in respect of all 
outstanding moneys secured by the deed. On examining the reference to 
present and future land in the deed, Clarke JA stated:
[I]n Belding v Read (1865) 3 H & C 995; 159 ER 812, that an assignment by 
way of mortgage of all the mortgagors’ personal estate and effects thereafter 
to be upon or about his dwelling-house, farm and premises situate at 
Reedham … or elsewhere in Great Britain failed both at law and at equity.
This decision was followed in Re Count D’Epineuil (1882) 20 Ch D 758. In 
that case Fry J proceeded on the basis, which he drew from the judgment of 
Baron Martin in Belding, that the equitable title to goods as well as to land 
was confined to specific goods, and did not extend to goods which were 
                                                          
74 See, eg, Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318, 
322 (Giffard LJ); Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 
530, 541–43 (Jessel MR), 546–47 (James LJ), 549–50 (Thesiger LJ); Re Colonial Trusts 
Corporation, ex parte Bradshaw (1879) 15 Ch D 465, 472 (Jessel MR) (using the 
expression ‘floating security’). The expression ‘floating charge’ seems to have been coined 
by Lord Macnaghten in Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v 
Manila Railway Co [1897] AC 81, 86; Another early use of the expression can be traced 
to Romer LJ in Illingworth v Houldsworth [1904] AC 355, 295. See generally Agnew and 
Kevin James Bearsley v The Commissioner of Inland Revenue and Official Assignee for 
the estate in bankruptcy of Bruce William Birtwhistle and Mark Leslie Birtwhistle [2001] 
2 AC 710 [5] (Lord Millet (on behalf of the Privy Council)); National Westminster Bank 
plc v Spectrum Plus Limited [2005] UKHL 41 [95]–[97] (Lord Scott of Foscote).
75 See s 51C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Re CMI Industrial Pty Ltd (In Liq); Byrnes 
v CMI Limited [2015] QSC 96 [7] (Mullins J); Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group 
Power Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (receivers and managers appointed) [2017] WASC 152 
[125] (Tottle J); Langdon, in the matter of Forge Group Limited (Receivers and Managers 
Appointed) (in Liq) [2017] FCA 170 [59] (Gilmour J).
76 Robert Pennington ‘The Genesis of the Floating Charge’ (1960) 23 Modern Law Review
634–38.
77 (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999.
78 (1992) 27 NSWLR 415.
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undetermined (at 760). Both these cases were over-ruled in Tailby v Official 
Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523 and have since been regarded as having been 
based on a misunderstanding of Holroyd.79
His Honour thus affirmed that general assignments of future property would 
be effective.80 Interestingly, Clarke JA was disinclined to the view that an 
assignment of future property couched in general terms might not be 
effective on the grounds of public policy, as intimated by Fry J in In re 
Count D’Epineuil (No 2).81 Rather, Clarke JA felt that existing protections 
with respect to hardship and unfairness would be adequate, although 
ultimately he noted that he did not need to reach a firm conclusion on the 
matter.82
Before concluding the present section it is incumbent to observe that the 
current state of the law with respect to descriptive specificity and the 
assignment of future property represents a return to the position which 
preceded Holroyd v Marshall.83 In Bennett v Cooper,84 for example, Lord 
Langdale MR upheld an assignment ‘if necessary, to sue for and receive, all 
sums of money then or thereafter to become due … and all legacies or 
bequests, which had already or might thereafter be given or bequeathed …
by any person whomsoever.’ Indeed two of the Law Lords in Tailby v 
Official Receiver85 were at pains to refer to this case.86
It emerges from the foregoing that there are no barriers to a general 
assignment of future land. Nor are there any barriers to a general assignment 
of future land and personalty. Thus, any suggestion that descriptive 
specificity is necessary in order to make an assignment of future land 
effective cannot be sustained. Having said this, it must still be possible to 
determine that there was an intention that the land in question would be 
included within the assignment’s ambit at the time of the agreement.87 In 
the final analysis, the validity of a general assignment of land will thus turn 
upon interpretation of the wording employed.
                                                          
79 Ibid 422 (Clarke JA (with whom Mahoney and Meagher JA agreed)).
80 See also Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Platinum Investment Management Ltd
[2011] NSWCA 48 [14] (Campbell JA).
81 (1882) 20 Ch D 758, 760 (Fry J). See also Re Clarke; Coombe v Carter (1887) 36 Ch D 
348, 352 (Cotton LJ), 357–358 (Fry LJ); Horwood v Millar’s Timber & Trading Co Ltd
[1917] 1 KB 305, 311 (Lord Cozens-Hardy MR); King v Michael Faraday and Partners 
Ltd [1939] 2 KB 753, 763–64 (Atkinson J).
82 (1992) 27 NSWLR 415, 423 (Clarke JA (with whom Mahoney and Meagher JA agreed)). 
It should be noted that a floating charge cannot now be granted by a natural person: s 45 
of the National Credit Code (found in Schedule 1 of the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 (Cth)).
83 (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999.
84 (1845–1846) 9 Beav 252.
85 (1888) 13 App Cas 523.
86 Ibid 530 (Lord Herschell), 535 (Lord Watson).
87 See, for example, Re Kelcey; Tyson v Kelcey [1899] 2 Ch 530, 533 (Kekewich J); Re Carter 
Holt Harvey Woodproducts (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 1) [2017] VSC 499 [44] (Robson J).
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IV FUTURE PROPERTY AND TORRENS LAND
The relationship between equity and the Torrens system in the late
nineteenth century was strained. This no doubt stemmed from the two 
paramount goals of the Torrens system: (1) to create a less complex land 
title system thereby reducing transaction costs; and (2) to provide title 
certainty in a colonial outpost with a dearth of legal skills necessary to 
properly administer common law title.88 Robert Richard Torrens89 pursued 
these two goals by instituting a land title system inspired by merchant 
shipping legislation which forbade the creation of equitable interests in 
ships. Early Torrens cases, such as Lange v Ruwoldt90 echoed these 
influences, holding that equitable interests stood outside the Torrens 
statutory regime.91 Over time, however, this view was rejected,92 finally 
being laid definitively to rest in Barry v Heider.93 Although today it could 
be scarcely denied that equitable interests are subsumable within the 
Torrens system, it is less certain precisely how principles of future property 
would apply to Torrens land.94 Take the following example: X has an 
expectancy under Z’s will to inherit Torrens land and makes an assignment 
of this expectancy to Y for valuable consideration. What are the legal 
implications? It is submitted that three issues beckon analysis: the nature of 
the interest created; the potential operation of the law of caveats; and the 
potential operation of the in personam exception to indefeasibility in the 
event that the assignor refuses to honour the contract. Each are discussed 
seriatim below.
A The Nature of the Interest Created 
The Torrens system is one of ‘title by registration’95 meaning that the rights 
of the registered proprietor flow from the ‘the act of registration and not 
                                                          
88 P Moerlin Fox, ‘The Story Behind the Torrens System’ (1950) 23 Australian Law Journal
489; Rosalind Atherton, ‘150 Years of Torrens—Too Much, Too Little, Too Soon, Too 
Late?’, Forbes Lecture, 6 November 2008, 2; Peter Butt, Land Law (Lawbook Co, 6th ed, 
2010) 745.
89 For the contributions of Torrens generally, see Greg Taylor, ‘The Emergence of the Torrens 
System’ in Hossein Esmaeili and Brendan Grigg (eds) The Boundaries of Australian 
Property Law (Cambridge, 2016) 28–30. It has also been suggested that a South Australian 
lawyer, Dr Ulrich Hübbe (German born living in Adelaide), was an influential figure in the 
Torrens system’s development. See Horst K. Lücke, ‘Ulrich Hübbe and the Torrens 
System’ (2009) 30(2) Adelaide Law Review 213–44; Murray Raff, ‘Torrens, Hübbe, 
Stewardship and the Globalisation of Property Law Systems’ (2009) 30(2) Adelaide Law 
Review 245–90; See also Creque v Penn [2007] UKPC 44 [13] (Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe (on behalf of the Privy Council)).
90 (1872) 7 SALR 1.
91 Ibid 7–9 (Hanson CJ), 13–17 (Gwynne J), 18 (Wearing J).
92 Cutherbertson v Swan (1877) 11 SALR 102, 106–100 (Stow J (with whom Way CJ 
agreed)).
93 (1914) 19 CLR 197, 206–07 (Griffith CJ (with whom Barton J agreed)), 216 (Isaacs J).
94 See generally, with respect to future property and Torrens land, Bridge Wholesale 
Acceptance Corporation (Aust) Ltd v Burnard (1992) 27 NSWLR 415.
95 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385 (Barwick CJ (with whom Owen J agreed)); See 
also Gazzo v Comptroller of Stamps (Vict) (1981) 149 CLR 227, 274 (Aicken J); Leros Pty 
Ltd v Terara Pty Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 407, 418 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ); 
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from an event antecedent thereto.’96 Would then the assignee’s interest be 
capable of registration? The answer is ‘no’. Two principal reasons can be 
advanced to justify this view. First, prior to the assignor taking the 
registered title, the nature of the assignee’s right is highly contingent and to 
speak of registration in such a context would be nonsensical; how can one 
register an interest which may never eventuate? Second, even if the assignor 
becomes the registered proprietor, the assignee’s interest remains equitable, 
akin to that of a beneficiary under a bare constructive trust, and is thus 
unable to be registered under the Torrens system.97 This means that the 
interest of an assignee under a contract for sale of future Torrens land would 
be an unregistrable interest.
                                                          
Parramore v Duggan (1995) 183 CLR 633, 635 (Brennan J); Allders International Pty Ltd 
v Commissioner of State Revenue in his capacity as Comptroller of Stamps (1996) 186 
CLR 630, 661 (Toohey J); Forestview Nominees Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA 
Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 154, 160 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); 
Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd v SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd (1999) 196 CLR 245, 262 (Gaudron, 
Gummow and Callinan JJ); Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd (2004) 220 CLR 
472, 490 (McHugh ACJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ) 503 (Kirby J); Halloran v Minister 
Administering National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (2006) 229 CLR 545, 559–60 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438, 443 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ); Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 
233 CLR 528, 531, 539 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ);
Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v KLALC Property Investment Pty Ltd [2008] 
NSWCA 6 [28] (Giles J (with whom Tobias JA agreed)) [130] (Young CJ in Eq); Perpetual 
Trustees Victoria Limited v English [2010] NSWCA 32 [7] (Sackville AJA (with whom 
Allsop P and Campbell JA agreed)); Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Smith [2010] FCAFC 91 
[54] (Moore and Stone JJ); Ermora Pty Ltd v Kelvedon Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 281 [37] 
(Edelman J); Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 42 [23] 
(Campbell JA and Tobias AJA); Salia Property Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways
[2012] SASCFC 33 [55] (Doyle CJ (with whom Anderson and Stanley JJ agreed)); Gerard 
Cassegrain & Co Pty Limited v Felicity Cassegrain [2013] NSWCA 453 [12] (Beazley P 
(with whom Macfarlan JA agreed)); Castle Constructions Pty Limited v Sahab Holdings 
Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 149, 159 (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Mekpine Pty Ltd 
v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2014] QCA 317 [82] (Morrison JA); Cassegrain v 
Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (2015) 254 CLR 425, 433, 442 (French CJ, Hayne, Bell 
and Gageler JJ), 455 (Keane J); Registrar-General of New South Wales v Jea Holdings 
(Aust) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 74 [106] (Bathurst CJ and Beazley P); Anderson v Anderson
[2017] NSWCA 131 [53] (Leeming JA (with whom Basten JA and Sackville AJA agreed)). 
96 Mayer v Coe [1968] 2 NSWR 747, 754 (Street J); Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee 
Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 170 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan 
JJ); St Vincent de Paul Society Qld v Ozcare Ltd [2009] QCA 335 [76] (Muir JA (with 
whom McMurdo P and Chesterman JA agreed)); Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Limited v 
Felicity Cassegrain [2013] NSWCA 453 [12] (Beazley P (with whom Macfarlan JA 
agreed)); Sze Tu v Lowe [2014] NSWCA 462 [240] (Gleeson JA (with whom Meagher and 
Barrett JJA agreed)).
96 Whatever doubt there may have been concerning the recognition of equitable interests in 
the Torrens context was dispelled by Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197, 206–07 (Griffith 
CJ), 216 (Isaacs J). See also Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491; (1934) 51 CLR 58, 64 (Lord 
Wright (on behalf of the Privy Council)).
97 Torrens legislation prescribes that where a trust deed exists, it cannot be registered: s 82 of 
the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW); s 37 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic); s 162 of 
the Real Property Act 1886 (SA); s 155 of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA); s 132 of 
the Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas); s 124 of the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT). The situation may 
be slightly different under s 132(3) of the Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas), where the recorder 
may describe the registered proprietor as a trustee; See also Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 
491; (1934) 51 CLR 58, 65 (Lord Wright (on behalf of the Privy Council)); In re Peychers’
Caveat [1954] NZLR 285, 286 (Archer J).
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1 The Exact Nature of the Assignee’s Interest Prior to 
the Assignor Becoming the Registered Proprietor
It is interesting to consider the exact nature of the assignee’s interest prior 
to the assignor becoming the registered proprietor. Clearly, it is contingent 
and thus unlike a regular equitable interest. This is reflected in the fact that 
an assignment of future property is said to only take effect once the legal 
title to the property vests in the assignor as bare constructive trustee.98
Does this mean that prior to the registered title vesting in the assignor, there 
is simply no equitable interest in favour of the assignee? This position, it 
would seem, is going too far. The contractual agreement to assign is, after 
all, created prior to the registered title vesting in the assignor. Moreover, 
various cases involving future property outside of the Torrens system have 
suggested that the assignee’s equitable interest can transcend the assignor’s 
bankruptcy.99 Correspondingly, the assignee’s right has been characterised 
as ‘higher’ than mere contract.100 If this is the established law, it indicates 
that there must be an equitable interest, albeit nascent, torpid and non-
proprietary, in favour of the assignee prior to the registered title vesting in 
the assignor.101
                                                          
98 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191; (1862) 11 ER 999, HLC 220; ER 1010 (Lord 
Chelmsford); Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 24 
(Windeyer J); Booth v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 165 
(Mason CJ); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New 
South Wales (1993) 45 FCR 284; 117 ALR 61, 73 (Hill J (with whom Beazley J agreed)); 
Peter W Young, Clyde Croft and Megan Louise Smith, On Equity (Lawbook Co, 2009) 
719.
99 Re Lind; Industrials Finance Syndicate Limited v Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345, 373–74 (Bankes 
LJ), 360 (Swinfen Eady LJ), 356–66 (Phillimore LJ); Palette Shoes Pty Ltd (in liquidation) 
v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 26–27 (Dixon J); Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson (1951) 82 
CLR 477, 485 (Latham CJ), 493 (Kitto and Williams JJ); Norman v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 24 (Windeyer J); Re Florio (1979) 97 DLR (3d) 74 [7]–
[10] (MacKinnon J); Booth v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 165 
(Mason CJ), 178 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Re Puntoriero; Ex parte Nickpack Pty Ltd
(1991) 104 ALR 523, 531 (Einfeld J); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government 
Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 45 FCR 284; (1993) 117 ALR 61, 63–64
(Jenkinson J), 73–74 (Hill J (with whom Beazley J agreed)); JT Nominees Pty Ltd v Macks
(2007) 97 SASR 471 [118]–[121] (Bleby J); See JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner,
Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) 268–69; Peter W Young, Clyde Croft and Megan Louise 
Smith, On Equity (Lawbook Co, 2009) 721.
100 Re Lind; Industrials Finance Syndicate Limited v Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345, 356–66
(Phillimore LJ). See also ibid, 373–74 (Bankes LJ), 360 (Swinfen Eady LJ); Palette Shoes 
Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 27 (Dixon J); Booth v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 165 (Mason CJ); Peer International 
Corpn v Termidor Music Publishers Ltd (Editora Musical de Cuba, Part 20 Defendant)
[2004] RPC 431 [76] (Neuberger J); FTV Holdings Cairns Pty Ltd v Smith [2014] QCA 
217 [44] (Fraser JA (with whom Holmes JA and Ann Lyons J agreed)); JT Nominees Pty 
Ltd v Macks (2007) 97 SASR 471 [119] (Bleby J); Lotteries Pty Ltd v Volteas [2015] VSCA 
226 [35] (Whelan JA (with whom Ferguson and McLeish JJA agreed)).
101 It has been observed that ‘[e]ven before the property in question comes into existence 
under this equitable doctrine … the assignee’s prospective rights are “more than equitable 
rights in personam.”’ See Commissioner of State Revenue v Abbotts Exploration Pty Ltd
[2014] WASCA 211 [210] (Murphy JA).
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Is then the assignee’s equitable interest a mere equity? The answer is ‘no’.
A mere equity is generally considered to connote an equitable interest which 
requires the assistance of a court of equity in order to be perfected—an 
equitable mortgage established by the doctrine of part performance prior to 
a court of equity’s validation is a good example.102 The interest of an 
assignee of future land does not comport with this category of interest, as
prior to the registered title vesting in the assignor, there is simply no existing 
proprietary interest which a court of equity can perfect. 
This leads to the conclusion that prior to the registered title vesting in the 
assignor, there is a sui generis contingent equitable interest.103 The 
hallmarks of this interest are nascence, torpidity, and non-proprietariness.104
This interest may convert to a regular equitable interest endowed with a 
proprietary character if the registered title subsequently vests in the 
assignor. This conversion has been explained as an exceptional application 
of the equitable maxim, equity regards that as done which ought to be 
done.105
B The Law of Caveats
It is uncontroversial that in the case of a regular contract for the sale of land 
the assignee has, prior to settlement, an equitable interest in the property 
which is capable of protection by caveat.106 The question at the present 
juncture is whether a caveat could be lodged by the assignee of future 
Torrens land. No guidance exists in the case law on this issue. As indicated 
by Torrens legislation, however, a caveat can be lodged by any person in 
relation to an unregistered dealing who claims to be entitled to a legal or 
                                                          
102 Double Bay Newspapers Pty Ltd v AW Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 42 NSWLR 409, 425 
(Bryson J); Mills v Ruthol Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 294 [131] (Palmer J); Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Ollis [2008] NSWSC 824 [73]–[75] (Einstein J). See also general 
discussion, Garwoli v Garwoli [2015] SASC 1 [14]–[15] (Dart J).
103 Heydon, Leeming and Turner suggest that the exact nature of the interest in the assignee 
before the legal title is vested in the assignor ‘remains unresolved.’ The same scholars 
thereafter posit that the interest is ‘abstract’ and ‘sui generis’. JD Heydon, MJ Leeming 
and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) 269.
104 Heydon, Leeming and Turner have stated, ‘[w]hat is the exact nature of the assignee’s 
rights before the property comes into existence? Authority establishes that it is more than 
a right of contract. But it cannot at that stage be an interest in property because there is no 
property in existence, or in the hands of the assignor, to which it can attach.’ JD Heydon, 
MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and 
Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) 269.
105 Ibid; See also Palette Shoes Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 26 (Dixon 
J); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Everett (1978) 21 ALR 625, 644 (Deane J); Booth 
v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 178 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ); 
Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517, 527 (Richardson J (with 
whom Casey and Hardie Boys JJ and Sir Gordon Bisson agreed)); McIntyre v Gye (1994) 
122 ALR 289, 296–97 (Davies, Burchett and Gummow JJ); Lotteries Pty Ltd v Volteas
[2015] VSCA 226 [38] (Whelan JA (with whom Ferguson and McLeish JJA agreed)).
106 See for example, Re Scanlan (1887) 3 QLJ 43; Woodberry v Gilbert (1907) 3 Tas LR 7, 9 
(Clark J); Hill v Keene (1903) 23 NZLR 404, 405 (Stout CJ); Wheeler v Baldwin (1934) 
52 CLR 609, 630 (Dixon J); Fernandes v Houstein (1963) 4 FLR 355, 357–58 (Dunphy J); 
Galvasteel Pty Ltd v Monterey Building Pty Ltd (1974) 10 SASR 176, 180–81 (Walters J).
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equitable estate or interest in land.107 The question must be then: is the 
interest of an assignee of future Torrens land an equitable estate or interest 
in that land?
Prior to the assignor becoming the registered proprietor, the answer is ‘no’,
as the equitable right which the assignee has is non-proprietary; it is, as 
noted above, a sui generis contingent equitable interest. An example may 
serve to better illustrate the conclusion. Assume that X has an expectancy 
under Z’s will of Torrens land and agrees to make an assignment of that 
land to Y for valuable consideration. In these circumstances, it would be 
improper to allow Y to place a caveat upon Z’s title.108 Z is entirely removed 
from the contract concerning X and Y which is contingent. It is possible, 
for example, that Z may decide at any time to sell the property or may will 
the property elsewhere.109
The result, however, is different once the assignor takes the registered title. 
This is because the element of contingency is eliminated, and the 
contractual obligations which exist between the assignor and assignee can 
be given proper effect; the sui generis contingent equitable interest is 
converted to a regular equitable interest. At this point, the assignee is able 
to lodge a caveat to protect their equitable interest in the land, having a 
stable proprietary interest. Interestingly, the lodging of a caveat in these 
circumstances has two currently recognised analogues: the interest of a 
purchaser under an executory contract for the sale of land,110 or 
alternatively, the interest of a beneficiary under a bare trust requiring 
transfer.111
                                                          
107 Section 74F(1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW); s 89(1) of the Transfer of Land Act 
1958 (Vic); ss 122, 124 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld); s 191 of the Real Property Act 
1886 (SA); s 137 of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA); s 133 of the Land Titles Act 1980
(Tas); s 104 of the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT); ss 138, 140 of the Land Title Act (NT); 
For discussion of s 74F(1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) see Taleb v National 
Australia Bank Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1562 [40] (Bryson JA).
108 This draws support from dicta in other contexts which have suggested that a caveatable 
interest must exist at the time the caveat is lodged—it cannot be lodged to protect a future 
interest: Martin v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1990] Tas R 65, 69 (Green CJ); 
Gangemi v Gangemi [2009] WASC 195 [40] (Murphy J); Stacey v Stacey [2010] WASC 
85 [12] (Beech J); Westpac Banking Corporation v Murray Riverside Pty Ltd [2013] 
WASC 433 [20] (Beech J) Watson v Gardner [2015] WASC 192 [14] (Mitchell J); 
Binning (as administratrix of the estate of Cowan) v Avsar [2016] WASC 194 [120] 
(Kenneth Martin J).
109 In re Parsons; Stockley v Parsons (1890) 45 Ch D 51, 55 (Kay J); Ogden Industries Pty 
Limited v Lucas (1968) 118 CLR 32, 37 (Lord Upjohn (on behalf of the Privy Council));
Klewer v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) [2008] FCA 1788 [50] (Bennett J); George 
v Fletcher (Trustee) [2010] FCAFC 53 [106] (Marshall J); Frigger v Reid [2017] WASC 
138 [11] (Martino J). 
110 Re Scanlan (1887) 3 QLJ 43; Woodberry v Gilbert (1907) 3 Tas LR 7, 9 (Clark J); Hill v 
Keene (1903) 23 NZLR 404, 405 (Stout CJ); Wheeler v Baldwin (1934) 52 CLR 609, 630 
(Dixon J); Fernandes v Houstein (1963) 4 FLR 355, 357–58 (Dunphy J); Galvasteel Pty 
Ltd v Monterey Building Pty Ltd (1974) 10 SASR 176, 180–81 (Walters J); Jessica 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Anglican Property Trust Diocese of Sydney (1992) 27 NSWLR 140, 
151 (Brownie J); CFHW v Burness [2014] VSC 451 [25] (Warren CJ).
111 Abigail v Lapin [1934] AC 491; (1934) 51 CLR 58, 65 (Lord Wright (on behalf of the 
Privy Council)); In re Peychers’ Caveat [1954] NZLR 285, 286 (Archer J).
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1 Assignee’s Failure to Lodge a Caveat once the 
Assignor has become the Registered Proprietor
A further question is what the implications of the assignee failing to lodge
a caveat might be once the assignor has become the registered proprietor. 
More pointedly: will the assignee’s failure to lodge a caveat mean that their 
interest will be postponed to later equitable interests? On the one hand, it 
might be said that the assignee’s failure to lodge a caveat could lead to a 
loss of priority vis-à-vis later equitable interest holders. This would be 
commensurate with the view articulated by Callinan J in Black v 
Garnock,112 namely, that a purchaser having an executory interest in land 
should ensure their protection by lodging a caveat or risk postponement.113
On the other hand, if it is accepted that the assignor holds the land on bare 
constructive trust for the assignee, then it would seem that the assignee 
would enjoy a very high degree of protection from later equitable interests, 
due to the rule in Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co v The Queen.114
The latter provides that a beneficiary will not be postponed because a trustee 
has created further equitable interests contrary to his or her fiduciary office. 
Although the rule in Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co v The 
Queen115 has not been tested in the Torrens context, there are numerous 
decisions which indicate that absent arming conduct, a first equitable 
interest holder’s failure to lodge a caveat should not lead to automatic 
postponement.116 Moreover, there are certain decisions which have 
indicated, even if only by way of obiter dicta, that the rule in Shropshire 
Union Railways and Canal Co v The Queen117 would not be negated by a
beneficiary’s failure to lodge a caveat.118
Before concluding the present section, it is apposite to contemplate one 
further issue, namely, what happens if the assignor of future Torrens land, 
once becoming the registered proprietor, reneges upon his or her agreement 
with the assignee and sells the same land to a later second assignee which 
progresses to settlement but not registration. In all Australian jurisdictions,
aside from New South Wales (NSW) and the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT), the matter will be decided by the principles of competing equitable 
interests. This means, in line with the rule in Shropshire Union Railways 
and Canal Co v The Queen,119 that priority would go to the original 
                                                          
112 (2007) 230 CLR 438.
113 Ibid 455.
114 (1875) LR 7 HL 496; See also Cory v Eyre (1863) 1 De GJ & S 149, 168 (Turner LJ); 
Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co v The Queen (1875) LR 7 HL 496, 507–08 (Lord 
Cairns LC), 511 (Lord Hatherley), 514 (Lord O’Hagan); Bradley v Riches [1876] 9 Ch D 
189, 192–93 (Fry J); Carritt v Real and Personal Advance Company (1889) 42 Ch D 263, 
270 (Chitty J); Taylor v London and County Banking Co [1901] 2 Ch 231, 260–62 (Stirling 
LJ (with whom Rigby and Vaughan Williams LJJ agreed)); Burgis v Constantine [1908] 2 
KB 484, 503–04 (Farwell LJ); Coleman v London County & Westminster Bank Ltd [1916] 
2 Ch 353, 360 (Neville J); Hill v Peters [1918] 2 Ch 273, 277–78 (Eve J).
115 (1875) LR 7 HL 496.
116 Glen Anderson, ‘Old Meets New: The Rule in Shropshire’s Case and the Torrens System’ 
(2014) 4(2) Property Law Review 112–14. 
117 (1875) LR 7 HL 496.
118 Glen Anderson, ‘Old Meets New: The Rule in Shropshire’s Case and the Torrens System’ 
(2014) 4(2) Property Law Review 112–14. 
119 (1875) LR 7 HL 496.
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assignee. In NSW and the ACT, however, a different result would 
potentially follow due to s 43A(1) of the Real Property Act (NSW) and s 60 
of the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), both of which state:
For the purpose only of protection against notice, the estate or interest in 
land under the provisions of this Act, taken by a person under a dealing 
registrable, or which when appropriately signed by or on behalf of that 
person would be registrable under this Act shall, before registration of that 
dealing, be deemed to be a legal estate.
This means that provided the second assignee took bona fide for value and 
without notice of the original assignee’s equitable interest, the second 
assignee would have an unregistered legal interest120 and would take 
priority over the original assignee. The same protection would extend to any 
sale made by the second assignee in the period post-settlement and pre-
registration due to the successive effect doctrine articulated in Wilkes v 
Spooner.121 Moreover, such protection would endure even when the new 
purchaser took with notice of the original assignee’s interest under the 
future land contract. As indicated in Jonray (Sydney) Pty Ltd v Partridge 
Bros Pty Ltd,122 the protection afforded by Wilkes v Spooner123 would not 
apply if the new purchaser was also the original assignor. This is because 
the doctrine in Wilkes v Spooner124 cannot be used to allow a trustee (the 
original assignor under the future property contract) in breach of trust to sell 
to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice (second assignee), only to 
reacquire the legal title and thus defraud the trust’s intended beneficiary 
(original assignee under the future land contract).
                                                          
120 Courtenay v Austin [1962] NSWR 296, 311 (Hardie J); IAC (Finance) Pty Ltd v Courtenay
(1963) 110 CLR 550, 584–85 (Taylor J); Jonray (Sydney) Pty Ltd v Partridge Bros Pty Ltd
(1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 568, 576–77 (Heron CJ, Jacobs and Asprey JJA); Meriton 
Apartments Pty Ltd v McLaurin & Tait (Developments) Pty Ltd (1976) 133 CLR 671; 10 
ALR 296, CLR 676; ALR 300 (Barwick CJ, Mason and Jacobs JJ); Black v Garnock (2007) 
230 CLR 438, 450 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Westpac Banking Corporation v Ollis [2008] 
NSWSC 824 [49] (Einstein J); Weller v Williams [2010] NSWSC 716 [16] (Ball J); John 
Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1, 42 (French CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ); Weller v Williams [2010] NSWSC 716 [13]–
[16] (Ball J); Taleb v National Australia Bank Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1562 [40] (Bryson JA);
Barlin Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] NSWSC 699 [37]–[38] 
(Ball J); Stone Leaf Capital Pty Ltd v Daly [2014] NSWSC 477 [31]–[32] (White J); Irina 
Prodger v Trevor William Prodger (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 339 [22] (Slattery J); On the 
difficulties of interpreting s 43A(1) of the Real Property Act see Commissioner of Taxation 
v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 20 [28]–[29] (Ryan, Stone and Jagot 
JJ).
121 [1911] 2 KB 473; Also known as the rule in Barrow’s case (Re Stapleford Colliery Co 
(1880) 14 Ch D 432, 445 (Jessel MR)).
122 (1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 568, 577 (Heron CJ, Jacobs and Asprey JJA).
123 [1911] 2 KB 473.
124 Ibid. 
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C Operation of the In Personam Exception to 
Torrens Indefeasibility in the Event that the 
Assignor Refuses to Honour the Contract
The in personam125 exception to Torrens indefeasibility concerns claims 
that are made against a registered proprietor of land.126 As the name of the 
exception suggests, it essentially concerns rights in personam or between 
parties, ensuring that a registered proprietor cannot use indefeasibility of 
title to avoid legal or equitable obligations.127 An in personam claim is 
typically created by a registered proprietor either ante or post registration128
and can also be created by a proprietor’s agents or employees.129 If 
registration is passed to a new proprietor unrelated to the in personam claim,
then the new proprietor will not be bound, as the claim will not operate in 
rem.130 In the majority of Australian jurisdictions, there is no legislative 
provision which refers to the in personam exception to indefeasibility.131
Nonetheless, the exception undeniably exists. In Barry v Heider,132 for 
example, Griffith CJ stated that the Torrens system in no way destroyed, 
                                                          
125 The in personam exception to indefeasibility is also referred to as a ‘personal equity’, 
‘right in person’, ‘equitable obligation’ and ‘equitable right’. It is submitted that any 
explicit reference to equity with regards to this exception to indefeasibility can be 
misleading, as not all in personam claims have an equitable origin (although most do). The 
phrase ‘in personam’, which coincidently is the most popular label, is therefore henceforth 
applied. On the foregoing terminological and conceptual issues, see Peter Butt, Land Law
(Lawbook Co, 6th ed, 2010) 819; Kelvin FK Low, ‘The Nature of Torrens Indefeasibility: 
Understanding the Limits of Personal Equities’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law 
Review 208.
126 On the exception generally, see Peter Butt, Land Law (Lawbook Co, 6th ed, 2010) 818; 
Brendan Edgeworth, Peter Butt’s Land Law (Lawbook Co, 7th ed, 2017) 874; Anthony P
Moore, Scott Grattan and Lynden Griggs, Australian Real Property Law (Lawbook Co, 6th
ed, 2016) 257.
127 On the requirement of a known legal or equitable obligation see Farah Constructions Pty 
Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] 230 CLR 89, 169 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon 
and Crennan JJ); Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133, 
146–147 (Tadgell JA (with whom Winneke P agreed)), 162 (Ashley AJA); Sino Iron Pty 
Ltd v Worldwide Wagering Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 101 [394]–[395] (Hargrave J); Anderson 
v Anderson [2017] NSWCA 131 [50] (Leeming JA (with whom Basten JA and Sackville 
AJA agreed)). 
128 Logue v Shoalhaven Shire Council [1979] 1 NSWLR 537, 563 (Mahoney JA); Bahr v 
Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604, 613 (Mason CJ and Dawson J), 638 (Wilson and 
Toohey JJ); Grgic v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group (1994) 33 NSWLR 202, 
222–23 (Powell JA (with whom Meagher and Handley JJA agreed)); Minister for 
Education and Training v Canham [2004] NSWSC 274 [47] (Pearlman AJ); Ciaglia v 
Ciaglia [2010] NSWSC 341 [113] (White J); Body Corporate No 12870 v Aldal [2010] 
VSC 366 [108] (Vickery J).
129 Grgic v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group (1994) 33 NSWLR 202, 222–23
(Powell JA (with whom Meagher and Handley JJA agreed)); White v Tomasel [2004] QCA 
89 [24] (Davies JA); Spina v Conran Associates Pty Ltd; Spina v M & V Endurance Pty 
Ltd [2008] NSWSC 326 [97]–[98] (Austin J); Refina Pty Ltd v Binnie [2009] NSWSC 914 
[35] (Brereton J).
130 S Robinson, ‘Claims In Personam in the Torrens System: Some General Principles’ (1993) 
67 Australian Law Journal 355; Tang Hang Wu, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror: A 
Framework of the In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility’ (2008) 32 Melbourne 
University Law Review 680.
131 In Queensland and South Australia, the in personam exception to indefeasibility is 
mentioned in s 185(1)(a) of the Land Title Act 1994 (QLD) and s 71(d) and (e) of the Real 
Property Act 1886 (SA).
132 (1914) 19 CLR 197.
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‘the fundamental doctrines by which Courts of Equity have enforced, as 
against registered proprietors, conscientious obligations entered into by 
them.’133 Likewise, in Frazer v Walker,134 Lord Wilberforce observed that 
Torrens indefeasibility ‘in no way denies the right of a plaintiff to bring 
against a registered proprietor a claim in personam, founded in law or
equity, for such relief as a court acting in personam may grant.’135 Other 
cases have made similar comments.136
In circumstances where the assignor of future Torrens land has agreed for 
valuable consideration to sell the land to the assignee, but then later reneges 
upon the agreement and instead remains the registered proprietor, an in 
personam claim would arise. This new claim—failure to assure future 
Torrens land—draws inferential support from two closely related equitable 
analogues: the right of a purchaser to specific performance and the right of 
a beneficiary to compel the trust against a trustee.
1 A Purchaser’s Right to Specific Performance
It was established very soon after the inception of the Torrens system that a 
purchaser can seek specific performance from the vendor in relation to an 
executory contract for the sale of land, notwithstanding the vendor’s 
                                                          
133 Ibid 213. 
134 [1967] 1 AC 569.
135 Ibid 585 (Lord Wilberforce (on behalf of the Privy Council)) (emphasis added).
136 Maddison v McCarthy (1865) 2 WW & aB (Eq) 151; Paoro Torotoro v Sutton (1877) 1 
NZ JR NS SC 57, 65 (Prendergast CJ); Cuthbertson v Swan (1877) 11 SALR 102, 109 
(Stow J (with whom Way CJ agreed)); Oh Hiam v Tham Kong (1980) BPR 9451, 9454 
(Lord Russell of Killowen (on behalf of the Privy Council)); Mercantile Mutual Life 
Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper (1991) 25 NSWLR 32, 43 (Mahoney JA); Groongal Pastoral 
Co Ltd v Falkiner (1924) CLR 157, 163 (Isaacs ACJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ); Breskvar 
v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 384–85 (Barwick CJ (with whom Owen J agreed)); Logue v 
Shoalhaven Shire Council (1979) 1 NSWLR 537, 563 (Mahoney JA); Bahr v Nicolay (No 
2) (1988) 164 CLR 604, 613 (Mason CJ and Dawson J), 637–38 (Wilson and Toohey JJ), 
653–54 (Brennan J); Heggies Bulkhaul Ltd v Global Mineral Australia Pty Ltd [2003] 
NSWSC 851 [96] (Austin J); Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd (2004) 220 CLR 
472, 491 (McHugh ACJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ); Ryan v Starr [2005] NSWSC 170 [84]
(White J); White v Tomasel [2004] QCA 89 [57] (Williams JA), [70] (McMurdo J); Farah 
Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] 230 CLR 89, 169 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ); Harris v Smith [2008] NSWSC 545 [56] (Brereton J); 
Spina v Conran Associates Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 326 [94]–[97] (Austin J); Perpetual 
Trustees Victoria Ltd v Cipri [2008] NSWSC 1128 [97] (Hall J); White City Tennis Club 
Ltd v John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1225 [100] (Macfarlan JA); 
Bonfinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269, 282 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, 
Kiefel and Bell JJ); Westpac Banking Corporation v Dunn [2011] WASC 7 [9] (Le Miere 
J); Residential Housing Corporation v Esber [2011] NSWCA 25 [56] (Campbell JA (with 
whom Macfarlan JA and Sackville AJA agreed)); Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v Sahab 
Holdings Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 149, 163 (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Simmons 
v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCA 405 [70] (Gleeson JA (with 
whom Beazley P and Barrett JA agreed)); Sze Tu v Lowe [2014] NSWCA 462 [224] 
(Gleeson JA (with whom Meagher and Barrett JJA agreed)); Despot v Registrar General 
of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 5 [164] (Gleeson JA (with whom Leeming JA and 
Sackville AJA agreed)); Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Worldwide Wagering Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 101 
[394]–[395] (Hargrave J).
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indefeasibility of title.137 Put alternatively, the fact that the vendor is the 
registered proprietor cannot be raised as a defence against the remedy of 
specific performance.138 Although the assignment of future property does 
not depend on a court’s order of specific performance,139 cases sourced from 
the general domain of specific performance in the Torrens context do 
establish that an assignment of future Torrens land cannot be negated by the 
assignor’s indefeasibility of title. 
2 A Beneficiary’s Right to Compel the Trust Against a
Trustee
Another in personam claim which is closely related to the failure to assure 
future Torrens land is the ability of a beneficiary to compel the trust against 
a trustee who is the registered proprietor: the trustee cannot refuse to 
transfer the land claiming indefeasibility of title.140 In Boyd v Mayor, etc, of 
Wellington,141 for example, Adams J noted that ‘[t]he power of the Court to
enforce trusts, express or implied … has been repeatedly exercised.’142 It 
follows that the same claim might also be applied in the context of a failure 
to assure future Torrens land. This stems from the fact that the assignor of 
future land is, upon taking the registered title, regarded as a bare 
constructive trustee for the assignee.143 This means that the assignor will be 
                                                          
137 LL Stevens, ‘The In Personam Exceptions to the Principle of Indefeasibility’ (1969) 1(2) 
Auckland University Law Review 41; Peter Butt, Land Law (Lawbook Co, 6th ed, 2010) 
819.
138 Maddison v McCarthy (1865) 2 WW & AB (Eq) 151; Paoro Torotoro v Sutton (1877) 1 
NZ JR NS SC 57, 65 (Prendergast CJ); Cuthbertson v Swan (1877) 11 SALR 102, 109 
(Stow J (with whom Way CJ agreed)); Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR, 197, 213 (Griffith 
CJ); Oh Hiam v Tham Kong (1980) BPR 9451, 9454 (Lord Russell of Killowen (on behalf 
of the Privy Council)); Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper (1991) 25 
NSWLR 32, 43 (Mahoney JA).
139 Re Lind; Industrials Finance Syndicate Limited v Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345, 356–66
(Phillimore LJ); Palette Shoes Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 27 (Dixon 
J); McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289, 296–97 (Davies, Burchett and Gummow JJ); 
Booth v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 165 (Mason CJ); Deputy 
Commissioner of Taxation v Bluebottle UK Ltd [2006] NSWCA 360 [25] (Santow JA (with 
whom Mason P agreed)).
140 Oh Hiam v Tham Kong (1980) 2 BPR 9451, 9454 (Lord Russell of Killowen (on behalf of 
the Privy Council)); Sistrom v Uhr (1992) 40 FCR 550, 557–58 (Davies, Ryan and von 
Doussa JJ).
141 [1924] NZLR 1174. 
142 Ibid 1223. 
143 Legard v Hodges (1792) 1 Ves Jun 478 (Lord Thurlow LC); In Re Gillott’s Settlement; 
Chattock v Reid [1934] 1 Ch 97, 108–09 (Maugham J); Bakewell v Deputy Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (SA) (1937) 58 CLR 743, 761–62 (Starke J); Visbord v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1943) 68 CLR 344, 383 (Williams J); Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation v Everett (1978) 21 ALR 625, 644 (Deane J); Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440, 450 (Barwick CJ, Stephen, Mason and Wilson 
JJ); Booth v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159, 165 (Mason CJ), 178 
(Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517, 
520 (Cooke P (with whom Casey and Hardie Boys JJ and Sir Gordon Bisson agreed)), 527 
(Richardson J (with whom Casey and Hardie Boys JJ and Sir Gordon Bisson agreed)); 
Bluebottle UK Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2006] NSWSC 706 [60] (Gzell J); 
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bluebottle UK Ltd [2006] NSWCA 360 [25]–[26] 
(Santow JA (with whom Mason P agreed)); RIL Aviation HL 7740 and HL 7741 Pty Ltd v 
Alliance & Leicester plc [2011] NSWCA 423 [206]–[207] (Young JA); Commissioner of 
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required to transfer the registered title to the assignee forthwith, and that the 
indefeasibility provisions of Torrens legislation will be no barrier to this 
process.
3 A New In Personam Claim 
Notwithstanding the two analogues mentioned above, the right of an
assignee of future Torrens land to compel the transfer would, stricto sensu,
be a new in personam claim (failure to assure future Torrens land). It is 
submitted that there would be no barrier to the recognition of this new claim.
The assignment of future property is founded in equity and thus conforms 
with the requirement of a ‘known legal or equitable cause of action.’144
V CONCLUSION
Although the basic parameters surrounding the assignment of future 
property are well settled, no comprehensive guidance has been provided by 
courts on how these might apply to the Torrens system. Despite this, the 
assignment of future land is readily subsumable within the Torrens system. 
Although the assignee of future Torrens land is, prior to receiving the 
assignment from the assignor, unable to register their interest, they can, 
once the assignor has become the registered proprietor (and bare 
constructive trustee), lodge a caveat to protect their equitable interest. In the 
event that the assignee fails to lodge a caveat to protect their equitable 
interest, the rule in Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co v The 
Queen145 would provide strong protection in a priority dispute against any 
later equitable interests.146 This protection could be negated in NSW and 
the ACT, however, when the later interest falls under s 43A(1) of the Real 
Property Act 1900 (NSW) or s 60 of the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT).
In circumstances where the assignor of future Torrens land reneges upon 
his or her agreement with the assignee and attempts to remain the registered 
proprietor, the in personam exception to indefeasibility would be available 
                                                          
State Revenue v Abbotts Exploration Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 211 [210] (Murphy JA); 
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145 (1875) LR 7 HL 496.
146 Glen Anderson, ‘Old Meets New: The Rule in Shropshire’s Case and the Torrens System’ 
(2014) 4(2) Property Law Review 112–14.
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to the assignee to enforce the assignor’s conscientious obligations.
Technically, this would be a new in personam claim: failure to assure future 
Torrens land.
Should the assignor of future Torrens land sell not to the original assignee, 
but to a new assignee who becomes the registered proprietor, indefeasibility 
of title will mean that the original assignee will only be left with contractual 
recourse against the assignor for breach of contract.
Although it might be surmised that Robert Torrens would lament the 
incorporation of ‘prophetic conveyances’147 within the system of ‘title by 
registration’148 which he helped to create, it is apparent that there is a place 
for future land contracts within that system. Equity’s pre-modern 
jurisdiction and the relatively contemporary Torrens system can work 
together to give effect to future land transactions.
                                                          
147 Belding v Read (1865) 3 H & C 995, 961 (Pollock CB).
148 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385 (Barwick CJ (with whom Owen J agreed)).
